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Mirror as Prism: Reimagining Reflexive Dispute 
Resolution Practice in a Globalized World 
Kenneth H. Fox

 
INTRODUCTION 
Private dispute resolution processes are an increasingly 
established global phenomenon.
1
 Some processes, like international 
commercial arbitration, have been formally in place for more than a 
century
2
 and draw upon clear principles of law and contract. 
Arbitrators and parties are guided by relevant treaties,
3
 procedural 
rules,
4
 and well-settled practices. Other international dispute 
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in the development of this Essay.  
 1. The fact that alternative dispute resolution (ADR) is an increasingly global 
phenomenon does not necessarily mean it is being “globalized.”  
Alexandra Crampton defines globalization as “a process through which the world is 
increasingly connected through economic, social, and political networks and 
systems.”. . . Nadja Alexander describes globalism as “a way of thinking about the 
world as a single marketplace in which political, legal and economic distinctions begin 
to blur.” She goes on to state that globalism views these dimensions of the process of 
globalization through the lens of economic rationalism or “economic imperialism.”  
Kenneth H. Fox, Unanswered Questions, Future Opportunities: Reflections on an Intentional 
Conversation about the Globalization of ADR, 27 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 297, 299–300 
(2005) [hereinafter Fox, Unanswered Questions]. Even the simple statement that ADR is being 
globalized warrants close examination. See id. 
 2. See UNITED NATIONS, U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV., DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT: 1.3 PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION 5 (2003), available at http://unctad. 
org/en/docs/edmmisc232add26_en.pdf. 
 3. See, e.g., Convention of the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 3; Inter-American Convention on International 
Commercial Arbitration—Panama Convention, Jan. 30, 1975; European Convention on 
International Commercial Arbitration, Apr. 21, 1964, 484 U.N.T.S. 364. 
 4. See e.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES & MEDIATION 
PROCEDURES (Oct. 1, 2013), available at https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeId=/ 
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resolution processes, like negotiation, mediation, conciliation, and 
conflict coaching, similarly have a long history and some process 
guidance.
5
 However, by their very nature, these non-adjudicative, 
cooperative processes are multidimensional, fluid, and complex. 
They require the intervener, parties, and their representatives to 
engage with one another in ways that go beyond the law and well into 
the realm of human relations.
6
 In order to make best use of such 
cooperative processes, interveners, parties, and representatives—
hereafter “conflict practitioners”—draw upon knowledge, insights, 
and skills related to communication, culture, history, language, 
philosophy, psychology, and sociology, among many other fields. 
They also draw upon their own professional and personal lived 
experience. 
As cooperative private international dispute resolution practices 
become increasingly common, it is tempting for conflict practitioners 
to assume that the human relations insights, skills, and practices that 
worked well for them at home will be equally effective (and 
appropriate) in an international, cross-cultural environment. 
However, exporting the ways we understand and interact with others 
in conflict from a domestic environment into new and different legal, 
political, economic, cultural, and social environments can be 
problematic.
7
 At best, exporting our set ideas and practices can lead 
to missed insights and lost opportunities for better solutions to the 
disputes at hand. At worst, this practice can exacerbate disputes, 
 
UCM/ADRSTG_004103&revision=latestreleased; HONG KONG INT’L ARBITRATION CTR., 
ADMIN. ARBITRATION RULES (Sept. 2008), available at http://hkiac.org/images/stories/ 
arbitration/AA%20Rules.pdf; INT’L COURT OF ARBITRATION, ARBITRATION RULES, 
MEDIATION RULES (2011), available at http://www.iccwbo.org/Data/Documents/Buis 
ness-Services/Dispute-Resolution-Services/Mediation/Rules/2012-Arbitration-Rules-and-2014-
Mediation-Rules-ENGLISH-version/.  
 5. See supra note 3. 
 6. This is not to suggest that adversarial processes do not also require strong human 
relations skills. However, cooperative dispute resolution processes are particularly amenable to 
a wider range of interaction among participants. 
 7. This becomes even more evident as we increasingly understand our social worlds 
through a postmodern lens. See, e.g., Kenneth H. Fox, Negotiation as a Post-Modern Process, 
in RETHINKING NEGOTIATION TEACHING: INNOVATIONS FOR CONTEXT AND CULTURE 13–27 
(James R. Coben, Giuseppe De Palo & Christopher Honeyman eds., 2009) [hereinafter Fox, 
Negotiation as a Post-Modern Process]; see also Harold Abramson, Outward Bound to Other 
Cultures: Seven Guidelines, 9 PEPP. DISP. RES. L.J. 437 (2009). 
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causing greater confusion, more deeply entrenched conflict, and less 
likelihood of resolution. As a result, attending to the human 
dimension of conflict and interaction should be a central part of 
global negotiation and dispute resolution practice.
8
 That is the focus 
of this Essay. 
Working in the global dispute resolution environment puts into 
clear relief the need for conflict practitioners to be attuned to 
themselves and to their counterparts in ways that might not have been 
apparent in local practice.
9
 As mentioned above, this attunement goes 
beyond technical legal knowledge and skills. It also includes being 
attuned to the subtle and complex human, cultural, linguistic, and 
other relational dimensions of working across social worlds. One way 
to be so attuned is to develop reflective and reflexive practice—
intentionally seeking to learn and grow from one’s past experience 
(“reflection-on-action”) and developing multiple dimensions of 
awareness as the conflict interaction actually unfolds (“reflection-in-
action”).10  
This Essay focuses on these two dimensions of reflective and 
reflexive practice. In the next part, I discuss the nature of reflection-
on-action and reflection-in-action from a modernist (“reflective”) and 
postmodern (“reflexive”) perspective. These modern and postmodern 
concepts of reflective and reflexive practice parallel a growing trend 
in the conflict literature from a “modernist” to a postmodern or 
“social constructionist” orientation to understanding conflict itself.11 
 
 8. This question is not new. See Fox, Unanswered Questions, supra note 1, at 299–306 
(identifying a host of questions that continue to challenge the field about the globalization of 
ADR, from concerns about intellectual imperialism to the impact of institutional funding on the 
spread of particular practices). 
 9. Even though the need for conflict practitioners to be attuned to themselves and their 
counterparts might not be apparent in local practice, it is still important. We should not assume 
all conflict practitioners, whether local or global, “think, or otherwise organize their social 
worlds, the way we do.” Fox, Negotiation as a Post-Modern Practice, supra note 7, at 18. 
 10. See DONALD A. SCHÖN, THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER: HOW PROFESSIONALS 
THINK IN ACTION 50, 278 (1983) [hereinafter SCHÖN, REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER]; see also 
DONALD A. SCHÖN, EDUCATING THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER 22–40 (1987) [hereinafter 
SCHÖN, EDUCATING]. 
 11. See, e.g., Fox, Negotiation as a Post-Modern Process, supra note 7, at 22 (describing 
a postmodern view of negotiation and knowledge); ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. 
FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION: RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT 
AND RECOGNITION 243 (1994) (describing human beings as simultaneously separate and 
connected, autonomous and linked, self-interested and self-transcending); KENNETH J. GERGEN, 
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In the final part, I examine how engaging with practice reflexively 
reveals additional dimensions of awareness about ourselves, other 
parties, and the conflict context. I then bring together the elements of 
reflective and reflexive practice to articulate a more holistic 
conception of “awareness” that can help conflict practitioners more 
purposefully learn from past experience and develop greater 
awareness as conflict interactions unfold.  
I. REFLECTIVE PRACTICE 
Reflective practice can be described as “a disciplined inquiry into 
the motives, methods, materials, and consequences” of learning.12 D. 
Marks-Maron and P. Rose offer three purposes for engaging in 
professional reflective activity: to redefine our understanding of 
professional knowledge; to further develop personal knowledge or 
self-awareness; and to evaluate the appropriateness of our actions.
13
 
The process of reflection acts “as a bridge from tacit knowledge to 
considered action.”14 It changes the nature of what we know so as to 
strengthen our ability to be helpful to the parties we serve.
15
 For the 
conflict practitioner, reflective practice helps to deepen and refine our 
competence both in action and on action,
16
 maintaining quality and 
improving client service. 
 
AN INVITATION TO SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION 151 (1999) (arguing that contemporary negotiation 
and mediation practices are lodged within a modernist worldview, and articulating a social 
constructionist standpoint for addressing conflict); JOHN WINSLADE & GERALD MONK, 
NARRATIVE MEDIATION: A NEW APPROACH TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 37 (2000) (describing 
the underlying principles of social constructionism); Ann L. Cunliffe, On Becoming a Critically 
Reflexive Practitioner, 28 J. OF MGMT. EDUC. 407 (2004) [hereinafter Cunliffe, On Becoming]; 
Jayne Seminare Docherty, Adaptive Negotiation: Practice and Teaching, in VENTURING 
BEYOND THE CLASSROOM: VOLUME 2 IN THE RETHINKING NEGOTIATION TEACHING SERIES 
481–509 (Christopher Honeyman, James Coben & Giuseppe De Palo eds., 2010); Ran Kuttner, 
From Adversity to Relationality: A Buddhist-Oriented Relational View of Integrative 
Negotiation and Mediation, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 931 (2010). 
 12. See Janet Lynn Norton, Creative Thinking and the Reflective Practitioner, 21 J. OF 
INSTRUCTIONAL PSYCHOL. 139, 139 (1994). 
 13. Margaret E. S. Forrest, Learning and Teaching in Action, 25 HEALTH INFO. & LIBR. J. 
229, 229 (quoting D. MARKS-MARAN & P. RODE, RECONSTRUCTING NURSING: BEYOND ART 
AND SCIENCE 229 (2002)). 
 14. Id. 
 15. A great deal has been written about reflective practice in a number of professions, 
most notably, in teaching, health care, organizational leadership, and even architecture. 
 16. See generally SCHÖN, REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER, supra note 10.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol45/iss1/8
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2014]  Reflexive Dispute Resolution Practice 45 
 
 
The idea of reflective practice is far from new. As far back as 
1909, John Dewey articulated the concept of reflective practice in 
teaching.
17
 For Dewey, reflective thinking  
emphasizes the consequences of ideas and implies future 
physical action; it is not merely an exercise in the theoretical 
manipulation or intellectual entertainment. Using methods of 
rational, systematic inquiry, the reflective person is able to 
confront and solve a variety of personal and professional 
obstacles; to be a proactive force in his/her environment.
18
  
In his influential 1983 work, The Reflective Practitioner: How 
Professionals Think in Action,
19
 Donald Schön significantly advanced 
our understanding of the need for, and an effective model of, 
reflective practice. Schön argued that the acquisition of “professional 
knowledge” alone in the industrial age was seriously limited when it 
came to helping practitioners adapt to changing social conditions.
20
  
Even if professional knowledge were to catch up with the new 
demands of professional practice, the improvements in 
professional performance would be transitory. The situations 
of practice are inherently unstable. . . . [P]rofessions are now 
confronted with an unprecedented requirement for 
adaptability.
21
  
Going further, Schön argued that professional education relied too 
heavily on “technical rationality”—that is, “instrumental problem-
solving made rigorous by the application of scientific theory and 
technique.”22  
Technical rationality is an epistemology of practice derived 
from positivist philosophy . . . . [T]echnical rationality holds 
 
 17. See generally JOHN DEWEY, HOW WE THINK: A RESTATEMENT OF THE RELATION OF 
REFLECTIVE THINKING TO THE EDUCATIVE PROCESS (1933). 
 18. Norton, supra note 12, at 139 (internal citations omitted). 
 19. See generally SCHÖN, REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER, supra note 10. See also SCHÖN, 
EDUCATING, supra note 10.  
 20. SCHÖN, REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER, supra note 10, at 14. 
 21. Id. at 15. He further argued that practitioners’ reliance on “professional knowledge” 
alone has contributed to a crisis of confidence in our professions. Id. at 13.  
 22. Id. at 21. 
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that practitioners are instrumental problem-solvers who select 
technical means best suited to particular purposes.
23
 
This approach to thinking leads to problem solving (selection, 
from the available means, of the solution best suited to an established 
end).
24
 While this approach appears constructive, once the 
practitioner sets the problem, “he chooses and names the things he 
will notice.”25 In other words, the practitioner becomes trapped by a 
particular way of thinking about a particular set of tools to fix a 
particular problem.  
Schön argues that such technical rationality is overly limiting, 
does not reflect actual practice, and ignores problem-setting—“the 
process by which we define the decision to be made, the ends to be 
achieved, [and] the means which may be chosen.”26 In real world 
practice,  
[p]roblems do not present themselves to the practitioner as 
givens. They must be constructed from the materials of 
problematic situations which are puzzling, troubling, and 
uncertain. In order to convert a problematic situation to a 
problem, a practitioner must do a certain kind of work. He 
must make sense of an uncertain situation that initially makes 
no sense.
27
 
 In the place of technical rationality, Schön articulates a reflective 
orientation toward problem-setting,
28
 which he calls “reflection-in 
action”29 and “reflection-on-action.”30 This orientation toward 
reflection is a way to “turn problems upside down.”31 Rather than 
making better use of research and technical knowledge, we should 
ask “what we can learn from a careful examination of artistry, that is, 
 
 23. SCHÖN, EDUCATING, supra note 10, at 3. 
 24. SCHÖN, REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER, supra note 10, at 40. 
 25. SCHÖN, EDUCATING, supra note 10, at 4.  
 26. SCHÖN, REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER, supra note 10, at 40. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Contemporary business literature refers to principles like this as “problem-
formulation.” See JACKSON NICKERSON, A GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING, LEARNING, AND 
PRACTICING CRITICAL THINKING 19–27 (2013). 
 29. SCHÖN, REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER, supra note 10, at 49. 
 30. Id. at 26. 
 31. SCHÖN, EDUCATING, supra note 10, at 12. 
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the competence by which practitioners actually handle indeterminate 
zones of practice—however that competence may relate to technical 
rationality.”32 Reflection-in-action builds “professional artistry,” an 
exercise of intelligence and a kind of knowing and competence that 
reveals itself when engaged with unique, uncertain, and conflicted 
situations of practice.
33
 As I discuss below, this notion of 
“professional artistry” has advanced our thinking about what 
reflective practice can mean for conflict practitioners. 
Other models of reflective practice have also emerged. David 
Kolb’s model of experiential learning is a four-element cyclical 
process of concrete experience; observation and reflection; forming 
abstract concepts; and testing concepts in new situations.
34
 Graham 
Gibbs developed a six-phase reflective cycle that involves 
description, feelings, evaluation, analysis, conclusion, and action 
plan.
35
 Christopher Johns offers a five-phase model of structured, 
written reflection, focusing on aesthetic, personal, ethical, empiric, 
and reflexive cues.
36
 Gary Rolfe proposes a three-question 
developmental framework: What? So what? And now what?
37
 
Stephen Brookfield articulates four prisms to becoming a critically 
reflective teacher.
38
 In his model, teachers (and presumably other 
practitioners) develop an increased awareness of their work from as 
many vantage points as possible. Brookfield proposes four prisms 
through which to gain this awareness: the autobiographical prism; 
through the students’ eyes; from colleagues’ experiences; and from 
the theoretical literature.
39
 Barbara Larrivee articulates a model that 
 
 32. Id. at 13. 
 33. Id. at 22. 
 34. David. A. Kolb & Ronald Fry, Towards an Applied Theory of Experiential Learning, 
in THEORIES OF GROUP PROCESSES 33–34 (Cary L. Cooper ed., 1975). 
 35. GRAHAM GIBBS, LEARNING BY DOING: A GUIDE TO TEACHING AND LEARNING 
METHODS 47 (1988). 
 36. Christopher Johns, Framing Learning through Reflection within Carper’s 
Fundamental Ways of Knowing in Nursing, 22 J. ADVANCED NURSING 226, 227 (1995).  
 37. Gary Rolfe, Beyond Expertise: Theory, Practice and the Reflexive Practitioner, 6 J. 
CLINICAL NURSING 93 (1997).  
 38. STEPHEN D. BROOKFIELD, BECOMING A CRITICALLY REFLECTIVE TEACHER 29 
(Stephen D. Brookfield ed., 1st ed. 1995). 
 39. Id.  
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combines both critical inquiry and self-reflection.
40
 In it, she 
identifies three essential practices: setting aside time for solitary 
reflection and keeping a journal; consciously bringing new insights 
and perspectives, to enable re-evaluation and consideration; and 
questioning the status quo or conventional wisdom, and being open to 
examining the assumptions which underlie professional practice.
41
 
In the conflict field, Michael Lang and Alison Taylor have built 
upon Schön’s conception of artistry and, combined with other 
principles of reflective practice, brought it to the practice of 
mediation.
42
 According to Lang and Taylor,  
[a]rtistry begins with a strong foundation in the skills, 
techniques, and strategies as well as the theories of one’s 
profession or endeavor. The artist must also have the ability to 
synthesize knowledge and skills in the moment of interaction, 
to integrate theory and technique into a series of strategies and 
interventions.
43
 
For Lang and Taylor, artistry is a dynamic process that develops in 
stages: from novice to apprentice; apprentice to practitioner; and 
practitioner to artist.
44
 It is an ongoing process of reflection, learning, 
understanding, and exploration.
45
 Lang and Taylor identify six 
hallmarks of artistry in mediation practice: attention to detail 
(responsiveness in the moment); curiosity (openness to new 
perspectives); exploration and discovery (not being bound by limiting 
assumptions); developing and testing formulations (holding on tightly 
and letting go lightly); interpreting with resilience and flexibility; and 
maintaining patience and vision (balancing between process and 
outcome).
46
  
This model of reflective practice helps the mediator experience a 
state of “flow,” where she simultaneously feels a lack of self and a 
 
 40. Barbara Larrivee, Transforming Teaching Practice: Becoming the Critically 
Reflective Teacher, 1 REFLECTIVE PRAC. 293 (2000). 
 41. Id. at 296–98. 
 42. See generally MICHAEL D. LANG & ALISON TAYLOR, THE MAKING OF A MEDIATOR: 
DEVELOPING ARTISTRY IN PRACTICE (2000). 
 43. Id. at 9. 
 44. Id. at 11–12. 
 45. Id. at 3–4. 
 46. Id. at 24–25. 
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fullness of self, “feeling caught up in something greater than usual, a 
transcendence of purpose and process.”47 All of the models described 
here help the practitioner develop forms of awareness and connection 
between principle and practice. All of the models promote learning 
and professional growth. 
II. SHIFTING FROM “REFLECTIVE” TO “REFLEXIVE” PRACTICE 
Reflective practice, as described above, refers to the ways in 
which the practitioner can better mirror what she observes around her 
and to the ways by which she incorporates her own tacit and formal 
knowledge into strategies for action. The metaphor of a reflective 
“mirror” is consistent with the modernist view that there exists an 
“original” object, action, or other phenomenon, independent of 
ourselves, to be seen, observed, categorized, and explained.
48
 
However, more recent scholarship argues that this concept of 
reflection—or mirroring—does not fully describe what happens when 
a professional works with parties. We do not merely observe. We 
interact. And by interacting with others, we are, by definition, 
engaged in a process where things change. New meaning emerges (is 
“constructed”) from the very interaction itself.  
Noticing that our interactions shape meaning represents a shift in 
thinking. Instead of the modernist view that assumes we can observe 
parties without having any impact, this postmodern view suggests 
that the way we make sense of things, in important ways, is actually 
socially constructed—that is, co-created through the very process and 
in the very moment of social interaction.
49
 As a result, from this 
different standpoint, we do not stand separate from what we observe. 
Instead, we are engaged with parties in ways where we are also part 
of the process of meaning-making. This different frame requires a 
 
 47. Id. at 214. 
 48. Ann L. Cunliffe, Reflexive Dialogical Practice in Management Learning, 33 MGMT. 
LEARNING 35, 38 (2002) [hereinafter Cunliffe, Reflexive Dialogical Practice]. 
 49. See id. at 37 (describing the “linguistic turn” in the social sciences from the notion that 
language is a means of representing reality to the idea that language is constitutive; that is, 
social realities and our sense of self are created between people through dialogic practices); see 
also supra note 11.  
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different way of making sense of, and learning from, our 
experience—reflexive practice.50  
The concept of reflexive practice embraces a view of the dynamic 
and emergent nature of how meaning is made. This is a particularly 
important framework for conflict practitioners, since so much of our 
work involves trying to make sense, for ourselves and the parties, of 
the conflicts they bring to us.  
[W]hereas reflection is often seen as a systematic thought 
process concerned with simplifying experience by searching 
for patterns, logic, and order, reflexivity means complexifying 
thinking or experience by exposing contradictions, doubts, 
dilemmas, and possibilities.
51
  
In other words, reflexive practice involves a form of critical 
dialogic engagement with others that can lead to “an unsettling” 
of basic assumptions, discourse, and practices used to even 
describe their conflict reality.
52
 
 This postmodern view of learning through reflexive practice
53
 
attunes the practitioner differently, to interact more fully with, and be 
more immersed in, the dynamics of the situation and environment in 
which the conflict is embedded. Put differently, learning and 
awareness is not merely a cognitive process of observation and 
reflection but a complex, embodied (whole body) dialogic process 
that encompasses various forms of knowledge—ways of 
“knowing.”54  
Conflict knowledge, then, is not just theory or information. 
Knowledge also incorporates what we know from within: a tacit, 
practical consciousness of everyday “sense-making” in which we 
implicitly know things about our surroundings. It also is “constructed 
through our interactions, and we make sense of what is happening 
 
 50. See Cunliffe, Reflexive Dialogical Practice, supra note 48. 
 51. Id. at 38.  
 52. Cunliffe, On Becoming, supra note 11, at 407. 
 53. Cunliffe, Reflexive Dialogical Practice, supra note 48, at 39. Cunliffe describes the 
impact of such a postmodern view as “raising important questions about how narratives 
embody political and epistemological suppositions which, through educational practices, 
regulate social experience.” Id. (citing Henry A. Giroux, Postmodernism and the Discourse of 
Educational Criticism, 170 B.U. J. EDUC. 5 (1989)). 
 54. Cunliffe, On Becoming, supra note 11, at 410. 
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around us as we interact with our surroundings.”55 As I mention 
above, this is relevant to conflict practitioners, because so much of 
our work is to help parties “make sense” of their conflict situations. 
As a result, we must be attuned to pick up on how parties are making 
sense of their experiences, and at the same time, how we make sense 
of our own experience with the parties and their conflict in all its 
dimensions. This greater attunement is even more relevant in global 
dispute resolution practice, where we cannot presume to know how 
parties make sense of their social worlds, experiences, or conflicts. 
Nor can we assume that the parties’ “sense-making” is the same as 
ours (or their counterparts). As a result, building on a reflective 
practice to include a reflexive orientation to professional 
development opens up new and important dimensions of awareness—
of ways to learn and improve our own conflict practice.  
In the next part of this Essay, I describe a model for greater 
attunement to ourselves, to parties in conflict, and to the broader 
conflict context. This model brings together a number of elements 
that have been studied and described elsewhere but have not been 
organized into this type of holistic model. I suggest this model can 
help equip conflict practitioners to strengthen their reflective and 
reflexive practice to become more fully attuned and engaged with 
parties, whether within or across social worlds.  
III. REIMAGINING REFLEXIVE PRACTICE—A PRISM OF AWARENESS 
Over the past several years, I have worked with various colleagues 
to develop a model that articulates the levels at which conflict 
practitioners can develop their personal and professional awareness. 
We have previously articulated the importance of developing three 
levels of awareness about conflict work: (1) awareness of “self”; 
(2) awareness of “other”; and (3) awareness of “context.”56 In brief, 
 
 55. Id. 
 56. See generally Kenneth H. Fox, Manon A. Schonewille & Esra Cuhadar-Gurkaynak, 
Lessons from the Field: First Impressions from Second Generation Negotiation Teaching, in 
VENTURING BEYOND THE CLASSROOM: VOLUME 2 IN THE RETHINKING NEGOTIATION 
TEACHING SERIES (2010); Kenneth H. Fox & Sharon Press, Venturing Home: Implementing 
Lessons from the Rethinking Negotiation Project, in EDUCATING NEGOTIATORS FOR A 
CONNECTED WORLD: VOLUME 4 IN THE RETHINKING NEGOTIATION TEACHING SERIES (2012). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
52 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 45:41 
 
 
“awareness of self” focuses on practices where the conflict 
practitioner is better attuned to her own way of thinking, feeling, and 
being—building awareness within. “Awareness of other” focuses on 
practices that help the conflict professional be better attuned to the 
parties in conflict. “Awareness of context” refers to a range of 
elements: the physical and practical conflict situation; the cultural, 
ideological (worldview), and other environmental conditions that 
surround the situation and interactions; and the roles and 
relationships (including power relations) of the parties within the 
larger relevant social context. Like awareness of self and other, 
awareness of context also means we recognize that the context in 
which conflict occurs is not static but fluid and emergent, requiring 
an attunement to the way the conflict unfolds.
57
  
Although articulating the three levels of awareness has been 
helpful, both in practice and as an organizational framework for 
teaching, the model has felt incomplete. However, the literature on 
reflective and reflexive practice discussed above, together with the 
important work of others,
58
 has revealed missing dimensions of the 
model of awareness. For example, Ann Cunliffe describes how we 
can equate reflexive learning with moments in which we are “struck” 
by something in a conflict, moving us to change our ways of talking 
and acting.
59
 According to Cunliffe, being “struck” involves three 
dimensions of spontaneous response to the events or relationships 
occurring around us: cognitive, emotional, and physiological.
60
 
Similarly, Michelle LeBaron describes four “ways of knowing” about 
our experiences in addition to intellectual knowledge: emotional 
ways of knowing; somatic ways of knowing; imaginative and 
 
Each of these earlier attempts to articulate dimensions of awareness has been helpful in 
clarifying the model presented here.  
 57. See generally Jayne Seminare Docherty, “Adaptive” Negotiation: Practice and 
Teaching, in VENTURING BEYOND THE CLASSROOM: VOLUME 2 IN THE RETHINKING 
NEGOTIATION TEACHING SERIES (2010). 
 58. See, e.g., MICHELLE LEBARON, BRIDGING TROUBLED WATERS: CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION FROM THE HEART 43–136 (2002); Michelle LeBaron & Mario Patera, Reflective 
Practice in the New Millennium, in RETHINKING NEGOTIATION TEACHING: INNOVATIONS FOR 
CONTEXT AND CULTURE 45 (Christopher Honeyman, James Coben & Giuseppe De Palo eds., 
2009). 
 59. Cunliffe, On Becoming, supra note 11, at 410. 
 60. Id. 
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intuitive ways of knowing; and connected ways of knowing.
61
 Nadja 
Alexander and Michelle LeBaron describe three dimensions of 
experiential learning: sensation, emotion, and cognition.
62
 I suggest 
these additional dimensions of learning and knowing strengthen the 
model. For purposes of clarity, I adopt Cunliffe’s three dimensions of 
embodied experience: cognitive, emotional, and physiological. When 
combined with the three levels of awareness previously articulated 
(self, other, and context) a more complete model emerges that 
provides a deeper and more holistic picture of reflexive practice and 
awareness for conflict practitioners.  
The levels and dimensions of awareness described above are 
consistent with scholarship and practices related to mindfulness. One 
of the leading figures in mindfulness research and practice in the 
conflict field is Len Riskin, who describes mindfulness as “a 
deliberate, present-moment non-judgmental awareness of whatever 
passes through the five conventional senses and the mind—to 
simplify: emotions, thoughts, and body sensations.”63 While 
mindfulness often relates to a set of specific practices,
64
 the 
underlying concept is directly relevant to this Essay. In particular, the 
process of “letting go” and being “present” associated with 
mindfulness is an important part of reflexive practice.  
Before describing the actual model, a word of explanation is in 
order. It may appear from Table 1, below, that the different 
dimensions of reflective and reflexive practice can be separated out, 
or deconstructed, into a variety of constituent parts in the same way 
 
 61. LEBARON, BRIDGING TROUBLED WATERS, supra note 58. 
 62. Nadja Alexander & Michelle LeBaron, Embodied Conflict Resolution: Resurrecting 
Roleplay-Based Curricula through Dance, in EDUCATING NEGOTIATORS FOR A CONNECTED 
WORLD: VOLUME 4 IN THE RETHINKING NEGOTIATION TEACHING 542 (Christopher Honeyman, 
James Coben & Andrew Wei-Min Lee eds., 2013) [hereinafter Alexander & LeBaron, 
Embodied Conflict Resolution]. 
 63. Leonard L. Riskin, Awareness and the Legal Profession: An Introduction to the 
Mindful Lawyer Symposium, 61 J. OF LEGAL EDUC. 634, 635 (2012). See generally J. Mark G. 
Williams & Jon Kabat-Zinn, Mindfulness: Diverse Perspectives on its Meaning, Origins, and 
Multiple Applications at the Intersection of Science and Dharma, 12 CONTEMP. BUDDHISM 1, 
1–18 (2011). 
 64. Riskin refers specifically to meditation practice. Leonard L. Riskin, The 
Contemplative Lawyer: On the Potential Contributions of Mindfulness Meditation to Law 
Students, Lawyers, and their Clients, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 23 (2002) [hereinafter Riskin, 
The Contemplative Lawyer]. 
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one could take apart a clock. This is not the case. Instead of thinking 
of this model in mechanistic terms (as presenting parts that can be 
disassembled and reassembled at will), the model should be seen 
holistically and relationally, where all of the dimensions described 
are interacting facets of an embodied whole experience—different 
prisms through which to see and understand emergent, complex, and 
interconnected experiences.
65
  
By organizing the three levels of awareness (self, other, and 
context) on a horizontal plane, and the three dimensions of knowing 
(cognitive, emotional, and physiological) on a vertical plane, we 
create a model that articulates nine interrelated facets (or dimensions) 
of awareness (see Table 1, below).
66
 None of the dimensions 
described is new. Each has been the subject of thoughtful study and 
discussion elsewhere.
67
 My hope is that by organizing the various 
dimensions together, a deeper and richer conversation can ensue 
about how conflict practitioners—and particularly those who work 
across legal, political, cultural, linguistic, and social boundaries—can 
better learn from, and be attuned to, the different relational 
interactions that are so central to cooperative global dispute 
resolution practice.
68
  
 
 65. Willis Overton, A Relational and Embodied Perspective on Resolving Psychology’s 
Antinomies, in SOCIAL INTERACTION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF KNOWLEDGE 20 (Jeremy I. 
M. Carpendale & Ulrich Muller eds., 2004); see also Lynne Keevers & Lesley Treleaven, 
Organizing Practices of Reflection: A Practice-Based Study, 42 MGMT. LEARNING 505, 506, 
515 (2011) (using the metaphor of “diffraction” to describe reflexive practice, and describing 
the concept of “prismatic dialogue,” which highlights the importance of emotion and body in 
reflective practice). Professor Mary Anne Noone, a participant in the Scholarship Roundtable, 
similarly uses the metaphor of “prism” as an instructional tool to help law students better 
understand the multiple ways in which they see the world. 
 66. Table 1 is not dissimilar to the “Johari Window,” which articulates a simple matrix of 
awareness. See, e.g., The Johari Window: What You Don't Know Can Hurt You, in THE 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LEADERSHIP: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO POPULAR LEADERSHIP THEORIES 
AND TECHNIQUES 459–61 (Murray Hiebert & Bruce Klatt eds., 2001).  
 67. One risk of using terminology that has been described in other sources is that the very 
meaning of the words used may differ from one writer to another. I attempt to be explicit in my 
intended meaning. 
 68. This model is a work in progress. I invite further reflection and refinement.  
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TABLE 1 
Cognitive    Emotional     Physiological 
 
 
Context Critical thinking  Social intelligence      Exteroception 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Other Critical insight   Relational empathy      Proprioception 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Self    Critical self-reflection  Emotional intelligence      Interoception 
 
 
 
 
As depicted by the dotted lines and small arrows, these nine 
dimensions are not separate cells that stand independently from one 
another. Nor do any of the dimensions belong solely within any one 
column or row. Instead, they are all dimensions of the same holistic 
body of knowing and awareness. For example, reflexive practice 
includes greater awareness of ourselves, cognitively, emotionally, 
and physiologically. As we develop greater self-awareness, we also 
become aware in new ways of others and of the greater context. 
Similarly, as we develop greater awareness of others and of our 
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context, we develop new and greater awareness of ourselves. This has 
been described as “intra-action,” a concept that stresses that human 
actors in a relationship “should not be seen as distinct entities but as 
entangled agencies that establish each other as well as being created 
themselves.”69 When taken together, these dimensions build a prism 
that helps us more fully understand what constitutes embodied 
reflexive conflict practice.
70
 What follows is a closer examination of 
each of the nine dimensions of this prism. 
A. Cognitive Dimension of Awareness 
The cognitive dimension of awareness focuses on becoming better 
attuned to the ways we process sensory and other information. It is 
most closely associated with notions of how we “think” about 
conflict. 
Critical Thinking—At the broadest, macro level, we must be 
aware of the context in which a conflict unfolds (and, reflexively, the 
ways we make sense of it). By context, I mean the larger environment 
and circumstances that surround a conflict event, as well as the 
related dispute resolution process. Context includes such things as 
practical surroundings (both immediate and larger environment, 
including the larger constellation of people and entities that relate to 
the conflict). It also includes the social and cultural context in which 
the conflict unfolds and in which the dispute resolution process takes 
place (including the relative social positioning of the relevant parties 
and stakeholders
71
). Finally, it includes our understanding of the 
worldviews and ways of thinking of those related to the conflict, 
among other things. 
 
 69. Keevers & Treleaven, supra note 65, at 508. 
 70. See Cunliffe, Reflexive Dialogical Practice, supra note 48, at 44 (using the analogy of 
a mosaic to describe the challenge of grasping a sense of the whole, while at the same time 
understanding its many parts).  
 71. For example, if I am an economically disadvantaged adult female member of a non-
dominant social group in a male-dominated environment, I may be seen (and as a result, 
treated) very differently than if I were a professional adult male member of the dominant group, 
even if all other factors are identical. This has implications related to power and the ways of 
interpreting the meaning of words and actions, among other things. 
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Critical thinking is a form of “intelligent thinking” that employs 
meta-cognitive processes to enhance learning and understanding.
72
 
“Intelligent thinking uses cognition to learn and to adapt in different 
contexts by updating, improving, changing, or generating new mental 
representations” of the events we observe.73 It is a disciplined process 
of thinking that is clear, rational, open-minded, and informed by 
evidence, and it approaches a problem from multiple perspectives. It 
can lead to a comprehensive and evidence-based “problem 
formulation,” which takes into account multiple contextual factors to 
be sure the right problem is being addressed.
74
 And, from a 
constructionist perspective, at the same time we seek to 
comprehensively formulate the problem, we must also critically 
examine our own assumptions about what we see and how we have 
conceptualized our own formulation. Cunliffe describes this as 
“critically reflexive practice,”75 which I suggest is an essential part of 
critical thinking.  
 Similar to critical thinking from a management perspective, the 
negotiation literature describes “3-D” negotiating, where the 
negotiator moves beyond the table to understand, and incorporate into 
her strategy, a broad range of variables that can shape or change what 
occurs “at the table.”76 This approach to negotiation similarly 
involves taking a macro view of the conflict situation, and a 
methodical process by which to formulate a negotiation strategy.
77
 
Critical Insight—At a more immediate level, we must be aware 
of, and attuned to, our counterpart(s) and the parties who are most 
directly part of the conflict as it unfolds and as it is addressed. We 
must also develop our awareness of the complexity of the immediate 
situation. Critical insight requires close observation. It calls upon us 
to develop a sense of curiosity—a strong and genuine desire to learn 
 
 72. See generally NICKERSON, supra note 28. 
 73. Id. at 4. 
 74. See Marcus Baer, Kurt T. Dirks & Jackson A. Nickerson, Microfoundations of 
Strategic Problem Formulation, 34 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 197–214 (2013). 
 75. Cunliffe, On Becoming, supra note 11, at 407. 
 76. See, e.g., DAVID LAX & JAMES SEBENIUS, 3-D NEGOTIATION: POWERFUL TOOLS TO 
CHANGE THE GAME IN YOUR MOST IMPORTANT DEALS 9–19 (2006). 
 77. Id. A contextual analysis, on its own, would be a form of modernist, reflective 
practice. In order to move toward reflexive practice, we must move beyond analysis to develop 
ways to be open to, and interact with, the context in which the conflict is unfolding.  
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from and about another as they see and experience conflict.
78
 It also 
calls upon us to apply our critical thinking skills to the more 
immediate elements of a conflict, discerning the perspectives and 
ideological standpoints of our counterpart(s) and the ways in which 
they formulate the conflict. And, like critical thinking, it requires that 
we engage in critically reflexive practice, examining our own 
assumptions about what we observe in others. 
Critical Self-Reflection—At the level of self, we must finally 
develop our capacity to be critically self-aware. As described above, 
this means an awareness of our own worldviews, ideological 
standpoints, assumptions, and thought-processes—those mental 
belief systems and frameworks that help us organize, interpret, and 
judge the information we receive.
79
 Critical self-awareness also 
includes an understanding of our cognitive biases or impediments—
heuristics—those cognitive shortcuts that can shape and misshape our 
judgments about what we observe.
80
 And, critical self-reflection, as 
with all of the dimensions described in this Essay, requires that we 
not only understand but also critically question our own worldviews, 
ideological standpoints, assumptions, and thought-processes, 
remaining open to the unsettling experience it might bring. 
Finally, critical self-reflection does not exist as an exclusively 
cognitive process. It also involves our emotional and physiological 
dimensions of awareness. As Alexander and LeBaron have stated, 
“[A]ll decision-making involves rational and emotional processes 
centered in the body, so we cannot observe, think or respond clearly 
without our bodies and our feelings.”81 From within the cognitive 
dimension, critical self-awareness calls upon us to develop a deeper 
understanding of what, and why, we think and believe as we do about 
ourselves, our counterparts, and the context in which we work.  
 
 78. Chris Guthrie, I’m Curious: Can We Teach Curiosity?, in RETHINKING NEGOTIATION 
TEACHING: INNOVATIONS FOR CONTEXT AND CULTURE 65 (Christopher Honeyman, James 
Coben & Jiuseppe De Palo eds., 2009). 
 79. See, e.g., Fox, Negotiation as a Post-Modern Process, supra note 7, at 21. 
 80. See, e.g., Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Heuristics and Biases at the Bargaining 
Table, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 795, 797 (2004). 
 81. Alexander & LeBaron, Embodied Conflict Resolution, supra note 62, at 555. 
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B. Emotional Dimension of Awareness 
The emotional dimension of awareness taps into various facets of 
emotional experience and being. Although this dimension is 
discussed separately, emotion is not separate from cognition or from 
physiological awareness. In fact, the term “emotional intelligence” 
frequently refers to qualities that reflect strong “links between 
emotion and cognition, coalescing this knowledge into a 
comprehensive model . . . called emotional intelligence.”82 My 
purpose for describing it separately is to elevate this dimension of 
awareness for focused attention. 
Social Awareness—At the macro level, emotional intelligence 
involves social awareness. Julie Nearass describes social awareness 
in the following way:  
Humans have an awareness of me and you, of mine and yours, 
of my actions and your actions, and of my intentions and your 
intentions. It is likely that this kind of thinking, especially the 
ability to take into account intentions and beliefs of others, 
enabled us to use language more deliberately and intentionally, 
to guide others toward a common purpose, and to conform 
with others to form distinct societies and traditions.
83
 
Social awareness includes social intelligence, which involves our 
capacity to negotiate complex social interactions, relationships, and 
environments in effective and appropriate ways.
84
  
It also involves cultural intelligence, “an individual’s capability to 
function and manage effectively in culturally diverse settings.”85 
Conflict practitioners who work in a global environment must have 
 
 82. Peter Jordan, Neal M. Ashkanasy & Kaylene W. Ascough, Emotional Intelligence in 
Organizational Behavior and Industrial-Organizational Psychology, in THE SCIENCE OF 
EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE: KNOWNS AND UNKNOWNS 356, 357 (Gerald Matthews, Moshe 
Zeidner & Richard D. Roberts eds., 2007). 
 83. J.J. Neiworth, Thinking about Me: How Social Awareness Evolved, 18 CURRENT 
DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 143 (2009). 
 84. See, e.g., Simon Baron-Cohen et al., Social Intelligence in the Normal and Autistic 
Brain: An FMRI Study, 11 EURO. J. NEUROSCI. 1891, 1891 (1999). 
 85. Soon Ang & Linn Van Dyne, Conceptualization of Cultural Intelligence: Definition, 
Distinctiveness, and Nomological Network, in HANDBOOK OF CULTURAL INTELLIGENCE: 
THEORY, MEASUREMENT, AND APPLICATIONS 3 (Soon Ang & Linn Van Dyne eds., 2008). 
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the awareness and ability to function appropriately in diverse and 
sometimes confusing social worlds.  
Relational Empathy—At the interpersonal level, the emotional 
dimension of awareness involves empathy, which has been variously 
defined as “sensitivity to, and understanding of, the mental states of 
others”;86 “the act of constructing for oneself another person’s mental 
state”;87 “an affective response more appropriate to someone else’s 
situation than to one’s own”;88 and “an emotional response that stems 
from another’s emotional state or condition and that is congruent with 
the other’s emotional state or situation.”89 Empathy has cognitive, 
affective, and physiological dimensions.
90
 It also has a relational 
dimension
91
 and is an extension of mindfulness. I use the term 
“relational” empathy here because it “goes beyond individual 
psychology and focuses on the creation of shared meaning during the 
interpersonal encounter.”92 Cultivating a focus on empathy as the 
creation of shared meaning strengthens a conflict practitioner’s 
engagement with reflexive practice. 
Emotional Intelligence—Emotional intelligence can be defined as 
“the ability or tendency to perceive, understand, regulate and harness 
emotions adaptively in the self and in others.”93 It includes 
“intrapersonal intelligence” or the knowledge of one’s own emotions 
and thoughts, emotional creativity, and emotional competence.
94
 
 
 86. Adam Smith, Cognitive Empathy and Emotional Empathy in Human Behavior and 
Emotion, 56 PSYCHOL. RECORD 3 (2006).  
 87. Id. (quoting Robert Hogan, Development of an Empathy Scale, 33 J. CONSULTING & 
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 307, 308 (1969)).  
 88. Id. (quoting Martin L. Hoffman, The Contribution of Empathy to Justice and Moral 
Judgment, in EMPATHY AND ITS DEVELOPMENT 47, 48 (Nancy Eisenberg & Janet Strayer eds., 
1987)). 
 89. Id. (quoting Nancy Eisenbert & Janet Strayer, Critical Issues in the Study of Empathy, 
in EMPATHY AND ITS DEVELOPMENT 3, 5 (1990)). 
 90. See id. As I discuss further below, neuroscience has explored empathy as an 
“embodied” phenomenon. See Alexander & LeBaron, Embodied Conflict Resolution, supra 
note 62, at 554. 
 91.  Benjamin J. Broome, Managing Differences in Conflict Resolution: The Role of 
Relational Empathy, in CONFLICT RESOLUTION THEORY AND PRACTICE: INTEGRATION AND 
APPLICATION 97, 98 (D. Sandole & H. van der Merwe eds., 1993). 
 92. Id. at 98. 
 93. Nicola S. Schutte et al., Emotional Intelligence and Interpersonal Relations, 141 J. 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 523, 523 (2001).   
 94. Id. at 524. 
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While emotional intelligence includes an awareness of others’ 
emotional states, central to the development of emotional intelligence 
is the ability to know one’s own emotional state, as it is being 
experienced. 
C. Physiological Dimension of Awareness 
The final dimension of awareness centers on the physical body. 
Anthropologist Kathryn Geurts has argued that a culture’s “sensory 
order is one of the first and most basic elements of making ourselves 
human.”95 Sensing is a bodily way of gathering information, and “is 
profoundly involved with a society’s epistemology, the development 
of cultural identity, and its forms of being-in-the-world.”96 A sensory 
order (or “sensorium”97) is a pattern of relative importance to the 
various senses, through which we learn to perceive and to experience 
the world.
98
 In other words, we embody our experiences. 
Only recently have western conflict practitioners paid close 
attention to this notion of embodiment. This may have to do with a 
long-held European, Anglo-American (Cartesian
99
) worldview, 
wherein the mind and body are seen as separate, and the intellect is 
privileged as the primary instrument for knowing “truth” and 
“reality.”100 Yet, “embodied” knowledge is part of who we are and, as 
 
 95. KATHRYN LINN GEURTS, CULTURE AND THE SENSES: BODILY WAYS OF KNOWING IN 
AN AFRICAN COMMUNITY 5 (2006). 
 96. Id. at 3. 
 97. Id. at 5. 
 98. Id. 
 99. DeCartes’ famous claim, cogito ergo sum (I think, therefore I am), is emblematic of 
our modern, Western intellectual tradition.  
 100. GEURTS, supra note 95, at 7. Nadja Alexander and Michelle LeBaron also write of 
this dichotomy:  
 The artificial and still deeply entrenched separation of mind and body; logos and 
ethos; and brains and brawn is a legacy of the eighteenth century Age of 
Enlightenment, also referred to as the Age of Reason. In order to preserve the purity 
and perceived superiority of intellectual reason, cognitive intelligence was separated 
from the arts, skills and other intelligences associated with physicality, creativity, 
imagination and emotionality. As a result, the Western intellectual tradition yielded 
pedagogy in universities and professional training contexts that privilege rational 
functioning, often to the exclusion of other senses and intelligences.  
Alexander & LeBaron, Embodied Conflict Resolution, supra note 62, at 543. 
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a result, part of the experience and an important dimension of 
knowing conflict. 
When we think of the senses, we often think of Artistotle’s group 
of five: seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, and touching.
101
 From an 
anthropological view, this schema of five senses is culturally 
embedded in Western thinking.
102
 Research supports alternative ways 
of thinking of our senses: “Galen said there were six, Erasmus 
Darwin thought there were [twelve], and Von Fre reduced them down 
to eight.”103 Geurts argues that sensory scientists would identify nine 
senses:  
(1) visual apparatus . . . ; (2) auditory apparatus . . . ; 
(3) olfactory apparatus; (4) gustatory apparatus; (5) tactile 
apparatus, responding to mechanical impressions; (6) tactile 
apparatus, responding to thermal impressions; (7) tactile 
apparatus, responding to kinesthetic impressions; 
(8) labyrinthine apparatus, governing balance; and (9) affective 
apparatus (pleasant and painful), responding to impressions of 
tickling, itching, voluptuousness, desiccation, burning, 
distention, pinching, pressure, and so forth.
104
 
Yet a different schema organizes our sensations into three general 
categories: extero-receptors, which include the five commonly known 
senses and provide a person with information about external objects; 
intero-receptors, which capture internal sensations (including 
pressure on internal surfaces, such as the esophagus, stomach, and 
intestines); and proprio-receptors, which provide information about 
three conditions: the state of one’s deep tissue, one’s own movements 
and activity, and the effects of one’s own displacement in space.105 
Whether one settles on three, five, six, twelve, or another number of 
senses, there are multiple ways of knowing our physical selves in 
relation to our environment. 
 
 101. GEURTS, supra note 95, at 7. 
 102. Id. at 9. 
 103. Id. at 7. 
 104. Id. at 8–9. 
 105. Id. at 9. 
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Our senses “are ways of embodying cultural categories, or making 
into body certain cultural values or aspects of being that the particular 
cultural community has historically deemed precious and dear.”106 In 
other words, the way we physically experience and interact with our 
environment is culturally connected and socially constructed. Yet, 
our modern Western way of interacting with our environment is to 
“suppress this inner environment and see only the outer environment 
before our eyes.”107 
Alexander and LeBaron describe Howard Gardner’s work about 
the concept of “multiple intelligences, which includes, among others, 
musical, bodily-kinesthetic, and spatial-visual.”108 They go on to 
describe how neuroscience research similarly supports the notion that 
we hold multiple embodied intelligences, among them that “what we 
come to experience as ‘emotions’ are in fact interpretations of 
physical sensations.”109  
If our senses are more than physiological organs, but are also part 
of culturally constructed ways of being in the world, then we can, and 
I argue, must, learn to become more aware of the physical dimension 
of our being. And if conflict is a whole-person experience for those in 
it, then, as conflict practitioners, body-awareness is an important 
additional dimension of our professional repertoire. As Alexander 
and LeBaron state, much of the “awareness” described above is pre-
cognitive.
110
 “[I]ncreasing body-awareness can work to enhance 
perception of the subtle cues and signals—both internal and 
external—in which such intuition is grounded.”111 As a result, “it 
becomes crucial to directly engage the body to bring perceptions, 
judgments, and emotions to a conscious level of choice.”112  
What, then, does it mean to engage in conflict work in an 
embodied way? This is a recently developing area of study and 
 
 106. Id. at 10. 
 107. Id. at 9–10 (internal citation omitted). 
 108. Alexander & LeBaron, Embodied Conflict Resolution, supra note 62, at 552. 
 109. Id. Examples of such physical sensations of feelings include “goose bumps, blushing, 
sweaty palms, shortness of breath, butterflies in the stomach and other manifestations of energy 
in the body.” Id. 
 110. Id. at 553. 
 111. Id. (internal citation omitted).  
 112. Id. 
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practice, and much more is to be learned.
113
 However, for our 
purposes here, I offer the following dimensions. 
Exteroception—At a macro level, body-awareness involves 
exteroception—our ability to sense stimuli that originate outside the 
body.
114
 Exteroception relates to the senses we most commonly 
associate with body knowing: sight, sound, touch, taste, and smell. 
We rely on our senses to interact with the external world. We can 
also attune ourselves to bodily sensations that originate externally. 
Just ask a food lover to describe the difference in experience between 
a Michelin three-star prix-fixe dinner and a freeze-dried backpacker’s 
meal.  
One application of the concept of body awareness of external 
stimuli in the conflict field is “constellation” work.115 Constellation 
work involves participants creating human spatial maps of conflict by 
physically placing surrogates to stand in various proximities to the 
person seeking to understand her conflict.
116
 The process of placing 
people in different physical orientations to the client and to one 
another creates a “constellation” of spatial relations, unlocking 
physical reactions and insights into the actual conflict itself.
117
  
Proprioception—A closer dimension of physiological awareness 
is proprioception—the body’s sense of its own location in the 
environment.
118
 In addition to our external senses, we have internal 
awareness—of our physical position, balance, and orientation in 
space. Because of proprioceptors throughout our bodies, we can 
develop physical coordination and the ability to navigate space with 
 
 113. The conflict field has taken an important step forward with the recent publication of 
THE CHOREOGRAPHY OF RESOLUTION: CONFLICT, MOVEMENT, AND NEUROSCIENCE (Michelle 
LeBaron, Carrie MacLeod & Andrew Floyer Acland eds., 2013) [hereinafter CHOREOGRAPHY 
OF RESOLUTION]. 
 114. Emily Beausoleil, Dance and Neuroscience: Implications for Conflict Transformation, 
in CHOREOGRAPHY OF RESOLUTION, supra note 113, at 4.  
 115. Alexander & LeBaron, Embodied Conflict Resolution, supra note 62, at 546. See 
generally INSA SPARRER, MIRACLE, SOLUTION AND SYSTEM: SOLUTION-FOCUSED SYSTEMIC 
STRUCTURAL CONSTELLATIONS FOR THERAPY AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE (Samuel Onn 
trans., 2007). 
 116. See Alexander & LeBaron, Embodied Conflict Resolution, supra note 62, at 546. 
 117. See id. In a related way, some biologists have suggested that humans have an innate—
biological—impulse to sense and be connected with other forms of life in nature, referred to as 
“biophilia.” See EDWARD O. WILSON, BIOPHILIA 1, 85 (1984).  
 118. Beausoleil, supra note 114, at 4. 
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minimal external stimuli. Examples include standing on a balance 
beam without falling, knowing how to move in absolute darkness, 
and knowing the most relaxing yoga positions.  
Closely related to proprioception is kinesthesia, which relates to 
our self-awareness of body movement.
119
 As Alexander and LeBaron 
explain, “[L]earning about the subtle cues, demands and tendencies 
of one’s own body has been linked to understanding empathy, or how 
other moving bodies might feel.”120 Alexander and Le Baron describe 
how dance can be used to learn how to more accurately perceive not 
only our own personal states but others’ personal and cultural 
positions, as well.
121
 
Interoception—Finally, the physiological dimension of awareness 
includes an awareness of our own body’s internal workings. Common 
parlance illustrates this concept: we have “gut feelings”; some people 
give us heartburn; we feel “flush” with joy; we carry the weight of 
the world on our shoulders. Each of these expressions is more than 
figurative. Each exemplifies the physical sensations we experience 
and how we interpret these sensations in relation to our external 
world. Our bodies are telling us something. Part of reflexive practice 
is learning to listen.  
Neurobiologist Antonio Damasio has argued that  
central to human consciousness, and to the problem of how we 
know what we know, is the experience of bodily feeling. . . . 
Consciousness involves two things: the brain engendering 
mental patterns that we call images of objects, and the brain 
engendering a “sense of self in the act of knowing.”122 
Playing on DesCartes’ “cogito ergo sum” (I think therefore I am), 
Damasio suggests an alternative: “I feel, therefore I know.” Put 
differently, knowledge is embodied beyond the limitations of 
traditional mind-body dualism.
123
 As described above, our sensory 
 
 119. Alexander & LeBaron, Embodied Conflict Resolution, supra note 62, at 554. 
 120. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Kathryn Linn Geurts, Consciousness as ‘Feeling in the Body’: A West African Theory 
of Embodiment, Emotion and the Making of Mind, in EMPIRE OF THE SENSES: THE SENSUAL 
CULTURES READER 164 (David Howes ed., 2005) (internal citation omitted). 
 123. Beausoleil, supra note 114, at 3.  
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perceptions include: exteroception—the body’s sense of the external 
world; proprioception—the body’s sense of its own location in space; 
and interoception—the body’s sense of its own internal stimuli, such 
as pain, temperature, and itch.
124
 Becoming more attuned to our own 
body gives the conflict practitioner another dimension of 
awareness—knowing—about the experience of conflict.125 
Taken as a whole, the nine dimensions describe a dynamic and 
holistic prism of conflict awareness. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS 
It is fair to ask, “So what do you DO with this prism?” Each of the 
nine dimensions described in this Essay suggests a corresponding set 
of practices to help conflict practitioners develop their knowledge 
and awareness. Some practices already exist.
126
 Others need 
development. Further research and experimentation is needed to 
translate these ideas into fully developed reflexive practices. But even 
where practices on all nine dimensions do not yet exist, we can still 
recognize the various facets of reflexive practice and develop our 
awareness on as many dimensions as possible.
127
 And, like other life 
skills, developing these dimensions of awareness can be helpful well 
beyond global dispute resolution practice.   
 
 124. Id. at 4. 
 125. Michelle LeBaron has commented about the preposterous idea of middle-aged 
diplomats and “expensively accoutered lawyers” exchanging their dark suits for dancing shoes. 
CHOREOGRAPHY OF RESOLUTION, supra note 113, at 1–2. Referring to a Swiss workshop, in 
Dancing at the Crossroads, LeBaron states that we can look forward, “if not to dancing lawyers 
and diplomats—at least to lawyers and diplomats who have an understanding of why movement 
matters in their repertoire of skills.” Id. at 2. 
 126. See, e.g., Riskin, The Contemplative Lawyer, supra note 64, at 23. See also, e.g., 
SCHÖN, EDUCATING, supra note 10, at 18 (describing a “reflective practicum” to build 
professional artistry). 
 127. In addition to supporting professional practice, this prism is a useful articulation for 
classroom use. Recognizing and developing these dimensions of awareness in ADR courses 
(whether negotiation, mediation, conflict coaching, or other courses) will ground students in the 
humanness of conflict work. 
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CONCLUSION 
Conflict practitioners increasingly engage in cooperative dispute 
resolution processes that cross legal, economic, cultural, and social 
worlds. This work calls upon them to use skills and knowledge that 
go well beyond the law—to draw upon knowledge, insights, and 
skills related to communication, culture, history, language, 
philosophy, psychology, and sociology, among many other fields. 
They must also draw upon their own lived experience. One new 
direction for cooperative global dispute resolution processes is to 
develop increasingly sophisticated reflexive practices—practices that 
embody the full complexity of human experience and interaction in 
constructive conflict work. 
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